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Introduction 
Reform of local government in Scotland, and, indeed, in the rest of the 
UK is on the political agenda. The failure of the poll tax has opened up 
questions not only about how local government is best financed but also about 
its structure and functions. The Conservative party is currently advocating 
single-tier authorities as more efficient and less bureaucratic than the present 
system and, were Labour to win the next general election and establish a 
Scottish Assembly, Scotland's local government structure would be bound to 
change. It is generally accepted, for example, that Strathclyde region, 
encompassing about half of Scotland's population, would be an inappropriate 
entity in the context of a National Assembly. It seems, therefore, safe to 
assume that, whichever party is in power after the next general election, the 
structure of local government will undergo change, even if the precise nature 
of these structural changes is, at present, unclear. 
The focus of this article is less upon local government structures, 
however, than upon its functions in relation to education, the largest single 
item of local authority expenditure. The article considers current 
developments in the devolved management of schools and further education 
(FE) colleges and implications of these for local authorities and for the Scottish 
Office Education Department (SOED). It argues that under the rhetoric of 
greater direct accountability to customers, namely parents and local 
employers, central government control of schools and colleges is being 
increased. It sees education authorities as agents of central government in this 
process and speculates about the room for manoeuvre authorities will have to 
set their own stamp upon priorities. Finally, the article considers some of the 
possible consequences for education authorities of the devolved management 
of schools and colleges. 
The approach to devolved management for schools and FE colleges has a 
number of common features, notably an emphasis on a strategic planning role 
for education authorities and a belief that school and college based 
management systems are closer to the level at which needs are expressed and 
are, therefore, more likely to be responsive to those needs than a remote and 
expensive bureaucracy, the education authority. The particular devolved 
management systems for each sector are rather different, however, and so they 
are considered separately below. 
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Before doing so, it is important to remember that devolved management 
of schools and colleges is taking place in a climate where market forces are 
believed by the Conservative government to be powerful agents in bringing 
about school and college improvement and in raising educational standards. 
As such, education is a good example of the shift in the balance between 
individual rights and collective welfare rights in the public services. Since 1979, 
when a Conservative government was returned to power, users of public 
services have been granted rights, as part of a general reaction against what the 
government perceived to be the failure of the providers of the services to deal 
effectively with social problems. In education, comprehensive schools were 
seen by commentators of varying political, social and educational opinions<ll 
to have failed to raise standards sufficiently and, more fundamentally, to 
represent the failure of the social democratic reformism of British education 
policy since the 1944 Act<2l which had given prominence to a collective welfare 
orientation. In other words the dominance of the producer, education 
authorities, over the consumer, parents, had failed to reduce inequalities in 
pupils' attainment associated with social economic status, to provide equality 
of educational opportunity and to manage resources effectively. This dismissal 
of the comprehensive system has been challenged<3l but, our concern is less 
with competing claims about the effectiveness of comprehensive schools, than 
with their role as a catalyst in promoting consumer or user rights at the expense 
of producer rights in the area of schooling. In any discussion of consumers and 
producers, it is important to be clear who they are. In the school system, 
government sees parents (acting as guardians of their children's interests) as 
consumers, while schools and education authorities, and, of course, 
government itself, are producers. We may note in passing the general neglect 
of the wider community interest in schooling in this formulation, a neglect 
which is reflected in the composition of school boards, as we shall see below. 
Parents' right to choose the school their children attend, introduced in 
Scotland in 1981<4>, was the first step in encouraging producers, this time 
schools, rather than education authorities, to compete with each other for 
customers. The rhetoric which surrounded the Bill as it was going through 
Parliament stressed the beneficial effects of consumerism on a 'nationalised 
industry', the opportunities for disadvantaged families to escape from the 
deprived areas in which they were trapped and the opportunities for schools to 
develop their own distinctive ethos and curricular strengths. It is interesting 
that the emphasis on curriculum diversity was later toned down<5l as the reality 
now is that schools compete in providing the same curriculum product, not by 
offering parents diversity. The introduction of a national curriculum in all but 
name in Scottish primary and secondary schools, national testing and 
assessment, the publication of schools' examination results and the 
introduction of national performance indicators all signify the criteria against 
which schools are intended to be judged. As we shall see below, there are 
opportunities for schools to offer diversity in teaching and learning processes 
and, of course, each school has its own distinctive ethos. Just how far such 
diversity of process can continue under the new system of national testing is a 
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matter of some debate(6l. It is rather as if all motor car manufacturers were 
competing to produce exactly the same model in terms of performance, 
particular outcomes such as emission requirements, speed and braking 
distances, gear ratios and so on were pre-specified, but they were free to 
choose their own design and colour. 
FE colleges have fewer constraints on curriculum provision, and are being 
encouraged to undertake market research before embarking on the provision 
of new courses. Like schools, however, student numbers are crucial to their 
funding. Whether colleges will compete with each other in providing the same 
courses for which they believe there is a large market or attempt to carve up the 
market by specialising in particular fields remains to be seen. 
Devolved management, then, so the argument goes, provides the 
opportunity for schools and colleges to sink or swim by their own efforts. Does 
it? Let us turn first to the devolved management of schools. 
School boards' powers 
The School Boards (Scotland) Act(7l came into force on 1 April1989. The 
Act provides for every local authority school in Scotland (except nursery 
schools) to have a school board. Latest figures show that 2,348 schools 
throughout Scotland now have boards, a total number which means that 96% 
of secondaries, 80% of primaries and 47% of special schools now have 
boards(S). The Act gives primacy to parents as board members. Although there 
are various categories of membership, teacher, co-opted and parental, the 
statutory composition of boards is such that parents are in the majority. Not 
only are they the largest single group; they outnumber all other categories of 
membership combined. Thus if a matter came to a vote at a board, all parent 
members, if present and if voting together, could prevail over any other 
combination of membership. The precise number of board members in each 




TABLE I: Composition of Boards 
Number of pupils 
1-500 501-1000 1001-1500 
4 5 6 
1 2 2 





Note: Single teacher schools will have 3 parents and 2 co-opted members but 
no staff members since the single teacher is the headteacher. 
It should be noted that the head teacher is principal professional adviser to 
the board, not a member, and that the Director of Education or his nominee 
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has the right to attend and speak at meetings, as does the Regional or Islands 
Councillor in whose ward the school is situated. 
Boards for individual schools have been in existence only a short time in 
Scotland, unlike school governing bodies south of the border where the 1980 
Education Act(9) ensured that each school would have its own governing body. 
Perhaps their shorter life in Scotland goes some way to explaining the rather 
more limited powers assigned to them than those conferred on governing 
bodies in England and Wales by the 1988 Education Act(IO). Governing bodies 
in England and Wales have powers to hire and fire school staff, for example, 
and extensive powers over the general financial management of schools, with 
local education authorities statutorily bound to devolve at least 85% of their 
budgets to their schools by 1993(11 ). In contrast school boards' functions are: 
• to promote contact between the school, parents and the community and 
encourage the formation of a parent-teacher or parents' association 
• to approve the headteacher's plans for use of the capitation allowance 
(typically the budget for books, stationery, equipment etc) 
• to participate in the selection of senior promoted staff 
• to control the use of school premises outwith school hours 
• to set occasional holidays during term time 
• to receive advice and reports from the headteacher and, in particular, 
an annual report which includes a report on the aggregated level of pupil 
attainment 
• to have any matter raised by the Board considered by the headteacher 
and education authority 
• to receive information from the education authority about education in 
the area including statements about past and intended expenditure on 
schooJs(tZ). 
Government pronouncements about the aims and purposes of boards 
stress three main functions, the greater involvement of parents in schools 
affairs, closer community involvement with schools and freeing of education 
authorities progressively from the business of routine school administration. 
Are school boards likely to fulfil the functions which SOED has in mind? 
We can answer this question at two levels: through considering the general 
powers and duties of boards against the claims which are being made about the 
overall purposes of boards; and through such limited research evidence as we 
have about the ways in which boards are operating. 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1992 
Are school boards a victory for the producer over the consumer? 
A glance at the functions specified for school boards reveals the very 
limited nature of their formal powers. Unlike the parental choice legislation 
giving primacy to a parent's right to choose the school attended by his or her 
children, and so shifting power from the producers to the consumer, school 
boards are more difficult to place on the continuum of individual welfare and 
collective welfare rights. Boards are not education producers or providers. 
Their rights and responsibilities make that clear. In the area of a school's 
professional concerns, such as curriculum, assessment, homework, discipline 
and so on, school boards have the power to ask questions, monitor 
performance and make representations. These are important powers and open 
up possibilities for boards to exert influence and pressure not only on schools 
and education authorities but also, as we shall see below, on central 
government itself. However, boards have no decision- making powers in these 
areas. Indeed, the areas .under the direct control of boards are sparse, 
involving administrative rather than educational matters. Although few would 
deny the need to have efficient administration of school lets and of the setting 
of occasional holidays, these areas are hardly the life blood of schools. Boards' 
powers in the area of school finance are also limited, concentrating, at least at 
the time of writing, on giving approval to headteachers' plans for buying books 
and equipment. Even where regions, such as Strathclydy and Dumfries and 
Galloway, are experimenting with greater devolution of financial 
management to schools, the role of boards is minor in Dumfries and 
Galloway< 13l and non-existent in Strathclyde<' 4l. It is the headteacher who is 
intended to be the real decision-maker on school finances under both these 
schemes. Rather, boards are somewhat analogous to consumer associations. 
They have legitimate interests in schooling as parents. The government 
assumption is that these consumer interests are better served by groups of 
parents operating through boards as opposed to individual parent pressure on 
schools. However, in many ways the rights of producers dominate. 
If we see central government as the ultimate producer of the public 
education service, then it is clear that collective welfare concerns override the 
rights and responsibilities of boards. If we define running schools as making-
decisions about what is to be taught, how pupils' learning is to be assessed, how 
many and what kinds of teachers are to be employed and the kinds of pupils to 
be admitted, it is clear that boards have almost no part to play. These strategic 
areas of decision-making about the curriculum, assessment, minimum staffing 
levels and admission policies are all firmly in the hands of the Scottish Office. 
Just how firmly curriculum and assessment policy is centrally controlled can be 
gauged by the detailed guidance on curriculum content and attainment targets 
issued under the 5-14 Programme<IS). This Programme specifies what children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 should be taught, sets out attainment targets 
against which children's learning should be assessed and intends to monitor 
national standards of attainment through national testing of children in 
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Primary 4 and Primary 7 in mathematics and reading and writing. The national 
Standard Grade examinations at 16, administered by the Scottish Examination 
Board, are seen as effectively controlling the curriculum of 14-16 year olds. 
Boards' powers to ask the education authority for information on almost 
any educational matter, and especially their power to ask for an annual report 
from the headteacher, can be seen as making these education producers more 
accountable and as shifting the balance towards an explicit recognition of the 
legitimacy of consumers' interests. The government's suggestion that boards 
should ask headteachers for reports about the school curriculum and about the 
level of pupil attainment, imply, however, that boards are to perform a 
monitoring role for the government. That is, boards are intended to act as the 
government's agents ensuring that schools are kept up to the mark. In other 
words, the producer, government, tells the consumers, boards, what their 
interest should be. This is the intended role for boards. Is it the one which they 
have been playing? Such limited evidence as we have suggests that boards are 
developing roles in ways not anticipated by the government. 
Evidence from the pilot school boards set up by Dumfries and Galloway a 
year in advance of the first statutory boards<16) and from observation of a 
number of meetings of the statutory boards(I?) reveals that board members 
tend to be strongly supportive of their schools. This support took the form of 
explicit statements of support, such as 'this school is a great wee school' but 
perhaps more revealingly in a marked reluctance to challenge the 
headteacher. Headteachers have been assiduous in providing reports on 
various aspects of school life often suggesting that these appear as items on the 
agenda, and the tendency of boards is to note these reports with very little 
discussion of their content and very little cross-examination of the 
head teacher. Of course, it is impossible to generalise from the small number of 
boards which have been observed to all school boards in Scotland. However, 
the evidence is consistent with larger scale surveys of parental views08l which 
reveal a general trust in the professional expertise of teachers and a belief that 
schools are doing a good job. So boards have not acted as thorns in the schools' 
flesh; rather they have been harnessed to support schools and to put pressure 
on education authorities for more resources for schools. 
Perhaps this was a role which government did expect boards to play, 
challenging education authority policy and practice. In contrast to the 
reluctance to challenge their headteachers, boards have had few inhibitions 
about cross-examining education authority officials about financial allocations 
to schools and the rationale for these allocations. Boards are sympathetic to 
headteachers' concerns about the lack of money for books and equipment and 
are generally shocked at the low level of per capita allocation, especially in 
primary schools. The lack of spending on school maintenance, repairs and 
decoration is highly visible to board members whose meetings are typically 
held in the school and who tour school premises from time to time as part of 
their duties. The need for parents to subsidise educational visits has also been 
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raised. 
Less visible to boards is the quality of the day-to-day teaching and 
learning in schools. Nevertheless, the general trust in teachers' professional 
expertise, and the traditional view of education in Scotland as a collective 
welfare right for all, have been reflected in boards' suspicions of government 
policy enabling individual schools to opt out of local authority control. Boards' 
concerns that opting out might lead to a two-tier state education service, to 
some extent lie behind the fact that no school in Scotland has yet opted out. 
Perhaps the most striking and unexpected (by government) role adopted 
by boards has been to collaborate with schools and teachers in opposition to 
national testing. It is ironic that government, having explicitly set out to create 
a parental voice in school affairs, through parental choice and school boards, 
has had to live with the consequences of this voice b~ing raised in opposition to 
its own policies and in support of schools. Boards have, in effect, supported 
one kind of education producer, schools, against another, government. The 
most telling evidence of this opposition has been the large scale boycotting of 
national testin~ by parents through withdrawing their children from pilot tests 
in April1991 (I l. In this boycott, parents had the explicit support of the largest 
teaching union, the Educational Institute of Scotland and the, sometimes, 
more tacit support ofthe education authorities. It is also ironic that boards may 
subvert the government's market forces approach to school improvement by 
banding together in a national federation. Moves are already underway to 
develop such a federation and regional federations of boards already exist, 
Lothian being one example. It seems probable that such a federation would try 
to exert pressure on national government rather than regional authorities on 
education issues. As with poll tax opposition, pressure will be brought to bear 
where real power and responsibility lies, central government, rather than on 
implementors of policy, education authorities and schools. 
Thus school boards have challenged the producer power of the 
government in education and to a lesser extent that of local authorities. They 
have not challenged the producer power of schools and teachers. Rather, they 
have supported schools. 
If school boards prove unable or unwilling to perform the monitoring role 
envisaged for them by government, what other avenues are available in the 
context of a government commitment to devolved management of schools? 
Two are looming large on the horizon, performance indicators for schools and 
school development plans. 
Performance indicators 
Performance indicators are essentially items of information provided at 
regular intervals designed to track the performance of a system. To be helpful, 
indicators have to provide valid and reliable measurement of a system's 
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performance, and have to report on key features of the system. Just as tests of 
pupils, indicators concentrate attention on what is to be measured and divert 
attention from areas which are not. SOED intends to produce a guide to the 
performance indicators used by Her Majesty's Inspectors (HMI) in inspecting 
schools. These indicators are likely to cover four main areas of school life -
curriculum, the quality of teaching and learning including pupils' examination 
performance, accommodation and use of resources. Under each of these areas 
there will be a number of descriptive statements about specific aspects and 
illustrations of different levels of performance. It is expected that schools will 
be measured on a four-level criterion-referenced scale from 'unsatisfactory' to 
'good' although all four levels will not be exemplified in the guide. 
The guide is intended to help schools and education authorities monitor 
their own performance by making explicit the criteria used by HMI, and 
schools are encouraged to extend the list provided and to develop their own 
indicators reflecting their own local circumstances. It is too early to say how 
the indicators will be used, whether schools and education authorities will have 
opportunities to develop their own indicators, how evidence about school 
performance will be collected and what the consequences for poorly 
performing schools will be. Nor is it clear whether all areas of a school's 
performance are viewed as equally important. Is a school's efficient use of 
accommodation as important as the public examination results of its pupils, for 
example? Whether a school's score will be publicly available through school 
boards to parents is also unclear. If it is, the challenge is to present the 
information in a valid and reliable way and in a way that makes sense to 
parents. The debate about how to present a school's effect on the attainment of 
pupils, and the need to differentiate attainment (what a child is likely to 
achieve given his/her home background) and progress (the effect of a school on 
a child's learning), illustrates the difficulty of presenting clear and 
understandable information about a school's performance<20l. 
One consequence of the emergence of performance indicators for 
authorities is likely to be a much greater emphasis in monitoring the quality of 
schools. Indeed, Strathclyde has already established a quality assurance unit 
and has recruited education authority inspectors to monitor schools' 
performance and promote school improvement. In other authorities, the 
traditional role of the subject adviser to encourage and support subject-
specific developments across all schools, and to provide in-service training for 
subject specialists, is disappearing. A picture is beginning to emerge whereby 
advisers have responsibilities for specific schools, and their role is to audit the 
school's performance against national and/or education authority criteria, 
encourage school self-evaluation and support the production of a school 
development plan. Presumably, advisers will also encourage and support the 
agreed development priorities in the plan. 
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School Development Plans 
Hand in hand with performance indicators go school development plans. 
In many ways these are similar to corporate plans, requiring schools to identify 
priorities for development, set targets and evaluate their success in attaining 
those targets. An agreed school development plan is seen as a contract 
between the education authority and its school. Each school is likely to have its 
own individual and distinctive plan and in that sense offer diversity to potential 
customers. Both national and education authority guides to development 
planning are now in existence and they stress its benefits in terms of managing 
change, coping with competing demands on schools and ordering priorities. 
Whether such benefits will accrue largely depends on schools' freedom to 
identify their own priorities, and to specify the number of developments they 
feel able to take forward in any one academic year. The national and regional 
guides to development planning stress that priorities for development have to 
be chosen by taking national and regional priorities into account as well as the 
school's particular circumstances. This assumes good advance knowledge of 
these priorities and hence national and regional education development plans. 
Whether national and regional priorities will be identified, and whether 
incompatibility can be resolved remain to be seen. 
Just as school boards have had unintended consequences for government, 
creating a parental lobby in support of schools, school development planning 
may also have unintended consequences. By encouraging schools to identify 
priorities, albeit within national and regional frameworks, set targets, identify 
the resources necessary to meet the targets and specify success criteria, 
national and local government are providing schools with a potentially 
powerful negotiating weapon. Schools will be in a much better position than 
hitherto to articulate their main areas of endeavour and the resource 
implications of these. Furthermore, by agreeing that a school's development 
plan is acceptable, the education authority may find it difficult to persuade 
schools to take on additional priorities during the course of the academic year. 
Skilful headteachers will be able to expose the competing demands on schools, 
and gain parental support for the school's development plan against additional 
demands for developments from either central or local government. Thus a 
system for the central control of schools through performance indicators and 
agreed school development plans may provide schools with more room for 
manoeuvre than seems likely at first sight. 
Implications of devolved management of schools for education authorities 
What are the likely consequences of devolved management of schools for 
education authorities? Paradoxically, one short-term consequence has been 
an increased workload. The existence of school boards has led to the 
establishment of school board units in each authority whose remit is to act as a 
channel of communication between the boards and the authority, provide 
training opportunities for board members and generally act as troubleshooters<21). 
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The units vary in size and are staffed at varying levels of seniority. Most either 
have direct access to senior officials through the unit head or are themselves 
headed by an Assistant Director of Education. 
A second short term consequence already mentioned has been to make 
authorities more directly accountable to parents through school boards. New 
financial management systems, identifying schools as individual cost centres, 
have enabled boards and headteachers to compare schools' budgets. Boards 
have been unpleasantly surprised at the low levels of per capita allocations to 
schools and, as mentioned above, have not been slow to ask for detailed 
explanations of budgetary allocations. Comparisons with neighbouring school 
budgets have had similar effects. Education authorities, therefore, are likely 
to be confronted with demands from school boards for additional resources for 
'their' schools. Inevitably, some boards will be more skilled and successful in 
pressing these demands than others and so school boards may increase 
inequality in educational provision. We must wait and see whether boards, 
through a national federation, represent parental views about the generality of 
schooling, or devote their energies only to their own schools. There is clearly 
the possibility of confrontations between boards and education authorities, 
the former having responsibility and loyalty to a particular school, and the 
latter having responsibilities for all schools in the region. 
A longer term consequence for education authorities is likely to be less 
concentration on the minutiae of financial management and a far greater 
devolution of budgets to schools. The experiments already under way in 
Strathclyde and Dumfries & Galloway give head teachers greater control over 
some aspects of the school budget such as staffing costs, repairs and 
maintenance and supplies and services. It is interesting that these 
experimental schemes devolve decision making to the headteacher not the 
school board. In the context of greater devolution of financial management the 
role of the education authority is to provide central services such as that 
provided by educational psychologists, teachers of children with special 
educational needs, advisers and the like. Either such services might be 
'bought' by schools according to the headteacher's perception of need, or an 
authority might decide to retain a proportion of the education budget to 
provide a specified level of such services in all schools. The increasing financial 
autonomy of schools in England and Wales, and the Education Minister, Mr 
Forsyth's, enthusiastic account of the local management of schools in New 
Zealand, following a visit there in April 1991<22>, strongly suggest that the 
Conservative Party intends that Scottish schools are to have greater control of 
their budgets. Whether this control will be exercised by the headteacher or 
school board remains to be seen. 
Education authorities are in a difficult position to say the least. If they act 
as government's agents and concentrate on easily quantifiable performance 
indicators and uncritically accept development priorities, they risk alienating 
schools and parents. If they develop their own performance indicators and 
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development plan in negotiation with schools they risk alienating government 
and being scrapped to be replaced by an administering authority with no party 
political clout, or indeed, schools being directly administered by SOED. The 
recent proposals for removal of FE colleges from local authority control 
illustrate the vulnerability of education as a local authority function at a time 
when local government finance is being reviewed and education is the most 
expensive local government function. 
Further education colleges and devolved management 
Under the Self-Governing Schools etc (Scotland) Act 1989<23l, 
considerable autonomy was given to FE colleges. In brief, education 
authorities must delegate the management, supervision and financial control 
of colleges to college councils. College councils, composed largely of 
employers, although also having at least one representative each from 
teaching staff, non-teaching staff and students, have substantial powers and 
much greater powers than school boards. For example, the college council 
may: 
• draw up the college's programme of courses 
• decide the qualifications which each course should aim to cover 
• run short courses in response to market needs 
• decide such matters as the minimum class size to make a course viable 
• select and discipline staff (though not dismiss staff) 
• determine the staffing complement and grade of college staff 
• undertake commercial activities and set up companies. 
Functions retained by the education authority include: 
• deciding the range of subjects to be provided by each college 
• entering into employment contracts with college staff 
• dismissing staff 
• ownership of college property and major maintenance and repair 
• taking action against the college principal. 
All education authorities have had to draw up schemes of delegation 
specifying the powers devolved to college councils and those retained by the 
local authority. 
The considerable power delegated to college councils is constrained in 
three main ways. First, a college council must submit a college development 
plan to their education authority each year. The plan, which must cover the 
next three academic years, has to include a number of components, for 
example, the number of students expected to be on roll, the courses to be 
provided, proposed activities other than courses, and estimates of income and 
expenditure. The college plan must be approved by the education authority 
which may modify it before approval and the college council must have regard 
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to the approved plan in exercising its functions. Secondly, the college council 
has to submit a report each year to the education authority and make it 
available to the public. While the content and format of the report is seen as 
matter for local decision, it seems likely that the report will be, at least in part, 
a statement of the extent to which the college development plan is being 
achieved. Furthermore, the existence of national performance indicators for 
colleges suggests that reports will contain information on: 
• student success ratio, ie the proportion of students who obtain a 
qualification 
• post-course success ratio (ie progression to employment or more 
advanced education) 
• quality of teaching and learning 
• unit costs 
• staff-student ratios 
• use of teaching accommodation<24l. 
Thirdly, college courses which are certificated by public bodies have to meet 
specific criteria. Thus colleges, all of which offer National Certificates and/or 
Higher National Certificates, and/or Higher National Diplomas, for instance, 
have their provision, teaching methods and assessment monitored and 
validated by the Scottish Vocational Education Council (SCOTVEC). While 
SCOTVEC's monitoring role will continue, it is less easy to predict what, if 
anything, will replace the role of the education authorities. The sudden 
announcement that FE colleges were to be removed from all local authority 
control was accompanied by a statement setting up an administering authority 
for all FE colleges in England and Wales. No such authority has yet been 
mooted for Scotland although the establishment of the Scottish Further 
Education Unit<25l to provide better support to further education colleges in 
implementing the Government's recent reforms of college management may 
be the precursor to a Scottish equivalent of the English arrangements. A 
particular function of the Unit is supporting college quality assurance systems. 
It may be, however, that given the developments in Scottish central 
institutions, and the proposals to transfer administration of the central 
institutions and the Scottish Universities to a Scottish funding council, a new 
Scottish body administering all Scottish tertiary education will emerge. 
Whatever the eventual system devised for the national administration of 
FE colleges, does their greater autonomy represent a victory for the consumer 
over the producer? The answer to this question depends on who counts as a 
consumer. College councils, having many more statutory rights and 
responsibilities for education and training provision than school boards, could 
be seen as a replacement for the education authority, albeit with a different 
membership composition. Thus, it could be argued, college councils as 
responsible for educational provision are producers. Power remains even 
more firmly in the hands of producers if we speculate about the way in which 
councils are likely to operate. College principals are now designated as chief 
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executives and it is likely that they will exercise real power. Although no 
research has yet been undertaken on college councils, it seems unlikely that a 
group of lay council members will play a formative role in drawing up a college 
development plan. It is probable that plans will be prepared by senior college 
managers, and presented to college councils for approval. In at least one 
college, the sub-committee of the council dealing with development planning 
spent 20 minutes on the plan which had been prepared by senior staff, with 
almost no debate and discussion. Just as with schools, there seems to be 
considerable trust in the professional expertise of college staff to get on with 
the job. The likely way for consumer power to be exercised is via student 
enrolments for the courses provided by particular colleges as funding follows 
students. 
Conclusion 
The accountability of public services has been a prominent issue in British 
politics at least since the 1970s with dramatic economic decline and the 
supposed failure of the education system to deliver an educated, adaptable and 
productive workforce. Although all the legislation designed to increase 
educational accountability has been enacted under a Conservative 
government it is worth remembering that it was a Labour Prime Minister, 
James Callaghan, who signalled concern about the falling standards in 
England in his famous Ruskin College speech of 1976 and initiated the so-
called 'Great Debate' about education which found formal expression in a 
Consultative Paper, Education in SchooJs<26l. What distinguishes the 
Conservative approach to accountability of the public services is the ideology 
of market forces. In schools this has been operationalised by conceptualising 
individual parents as consumers with the right to choose which schools their 
children will attend, and by giving schools the right to opt out of local authority 
control. Giving FE colleges considerable autonomy to run their own affairs is 
the most recent measure to make provision more responsive to the needs of 
customers by removing the protection of a remote bureaucracy, the education 
authority. 
School boards, however, do not devolve power and decision making. 
Indeed government is attempting to increase control of schools through 
curriculum and assessment policy, performance indicators and school 
development planning. Involving parents in the running of schools through 
school boards is largely a cosmetic exercise when key areas of curriculum, 
assessment, staffing, admissions and most finance is outwith boards' power. 
Boards are intended by government to monitor their schools' adherence to 
government policy, hence school development plans, and to keep a check on 
standards, hence national testing and performance indicators. 
Even when power has been devolved to the consumer, it is more apparent 
than real. Certainly, in urban areas, parents exercise their rights to choose 
schools for their children, with up to 25% doing so in some places but, in large 
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parts of the country, geography dictates the school to be attended. The 
government intends that schools which underperform improve their 
performance, through market forces, or suffer the consequences of falling 
rolls. Whatever one's opinion of this approach to school i111provement, what 
has been striking has been parental support of schools and parental trust in the 
professional expertise of teachers. The government has created a parental 
lobby which, up until the present, has supported schools against government 
policy, most notably on national testing. One can predict that the parental 
lobby will be equally vocal if schools are given greater financial autonomy, and 
that there will be increased pressure on government for extra resources for 
schools. Headteachers and their staff will build on parents' trust by providing 
information on their priorities, the rationale for their priorities and their 
implications for the generality of school work. Parents will have the 
opportunity as never before to understand the demands on schools and are 
likely to support schools rather than education authorities or central 
government. 
Predictions about FE are more difficult. The undoubtedly greater 
autonomy devolved to colleges and the creation of college councils to manage 
college affairs also suggests power for producers, especially as colleges are 
likely to have to report to a monitoring body of some sort, in terms decided by 
government. Furthermore, the day-to-day management of colleges and the 
preparation and implementation of college development plans seem likely to 
remain in the hands of front -line producers, college principals and senior staff. 
The future of education authorities is unclear. It seems likely that some 
administrative unit will be needed to monitor standards and quality. One 
possibility is that the unit will be new single tier authorities with local 
politicians exercising power and influence on schools. Another possibility is 
that the unti will be devoid of any political representation and report directly to 
SOED. Alternatively, such a unit might report directly to a Scottish Assembly 
which would also have responsibility for further and higher education. We 
must wait and see. 
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